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Abstract 
If the Eurozone follows the precedent of the 1930s, it will not survive.  The attractions of escaping 
from the gold standard then were massive and they point to a strategy of devalue and default for 
today’s crisis countries.  A fully-federal Europe with a banking union and a fiscal union is the best 
solution to this problem but is politically infeasible.  However, it may be possible to underpin the 
Euro by a ‘Bretton-Woods compromise’ that accepts a retreat from some aspects of deep economic 
integration since exit entails new risks of financial crisis that were not present eighty years ago. 
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1. Introduction 
The economic crisis in Europe that started in 2008 is the most serious since the 1930s.  Not 
surprisingly, the experience of that decade can be seen as a source of lessons as to the dangers that 
Europe now faces and the policy responses that may be forthcoming.  Looking at the 1930s in this 
way is not reassuring.  That decade was notorious not only for the severe economic downturn of the 
Great Depression but it was also a period notorious for banking crises, currency wars, exchange 
controls, protectionism and sovereign default.  The gold standard collapsed, central banks lost their 
independence, and the public lost its faith in the market economy.  Ultimately, it took half a century 
fully to reverse the 1930s’ economic disintegration of Europe although a beginning was made in the 
1940s under the auspices of the Bretton Woods Agreement and the Marshall Plan. 
If the debacle of the 1930s were to be repeated, the prognosis for the Eurozone would indeed be 
gloomy.  In order to assess the likelihood of this happening and potentially to avert this outcome, it 
is important to understand in some depth the evolution of economic policy and its rationale in the 
aftermath of the shocks that battered the European economy following the Wall Street Crash.  This 
paper provides just such an analysis using ideas building on the macroeconomic trilemma 
highlighted by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) to throw light on the question ‘will this time be different?’.  
A key feature of 1930s’ macroeconomic policymaking was that, for much of the 1930s in depressed 
economies, nominal interest rates were at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and the implications of trying 
to achieve economic recovery in such conditions are also explored. 
In any event, the post-2008 crisis has significantly affected the medium-term prospects of European 
economies.  The legacy is one of misalignments of real exchange rates, high public debt to GDP 
ratios, a prolonged period of fiscal consolidation, a fragile banking system and levels of real GDP that 
will be appreciably below what would have been expected pre-crisis.  The design of European 
Monetary Union has been revealed to be fundamentally flawed.  The policy space available to 
troubled Eurozone economies appears to be uncomfortably narrow.  The status quo does not seem 
to offer a viable future.  Using the political trilemma proposed by Rodrik (2000) to reconsider the 
1940s’ response to the damage done by the 1930s, this paper argues that the choice for the 
Eurozone economies lies between minor or major disintegration and that, either way, this will have 
adverse effects on growth performance. 
1. Economic Disintegration in the 1930s: an Outline 
The Great Depression of the early 1930s was characterized by deflation, slump and financial crises; 
prices declined, there were substantial and prolonged falls in real GDP and unemployment rose 
dramatically while banking and currency crises proliferated.  The responses of policymakers added 
up to a major globalization backlash which entailed greatly increased barriers to international trade 
and capital flows.  Economic policy was very much the domain of the nation state and was 
orientated to what were perceived as domestic needs; attempts at international policy coordination 
such as the World Economic Conference held in London in 1933 were failures and, of course, this era 
preceded the establishment of the GATT/WTO and the IMF. 
Table 1 records the macroeconomic experience of the industrialized countries.  The average 
decrease in real GDP was almost 17 per cent and the 1929 level was not regained until 1936.  While 
output fell sharply in most countries there was a considerable variance – on an annual basis, real 
2 
 
GDP fell from peak to trough by over 25 per cent in both Germany and the United States but only by 
about 6 per cent in the United Kingdom (Crafts and Fearon, 2013).  In general, the slump was much 
worse for countries in which there was a banking crisis and which were slow to leave the gold 
standard.  The 1930s are rightly notorious for high unemployment but internationally comparable 
data are scarce; the figures in Table 1 are useful for suggesting how rapidly unemployment rose and 
how slowly it fell in the internationally tradable industrial sector but, by excluding the service and 
public sectors, significantly exaggerate overall levels of unemployment.  Table 1 also reports a steep 
decline in the volume of world trade which fell initially by about 24 per cent and never regained its 
1929 peak during the 1930s. 
In Table 2 we see that many countries had a banking crisis (financial distress in the banking system, 
bank liquidations, significant bank runs etc.)  Again experience varied greatly – in the United 
Kingdom there were no bank failures whereas in the United States about 9000 banks (accounting for 
about 1/7th of all deposits) failed.   A comparison of the catastrophic banking crisis in 1931 with that 
of 2007/08 shows that the countries involved in 1931 accounted for 55.6 percent of world GDP while 
the figure for the latter period is 33.5 percent ( Reinhart, 2010; Maddison, 2010). 
Table 3 chronicles the collapse of the gold standard in the 1930s quite soon after its restoration post 
World War I.  Famously, the United Kingdom made an ignominious exit in September 1931 having 
returned to gold only 6 years earlier.  Virtually all major economies were on gold in 1929 but by late 
1936 the French devaluation signalled the final demise of an international monetary system based 
on free convertibility of currencies into gold at a fixed parity.  Table 4 shows that the price of staying 
on the gold standard was a big loss of international competitiveness – reflected in numbers 
exceeding 100 – and massive deflationary pressure on prices.  There was a stark contrast between 
France and the United Kingdom by late 1933.   
It is also apparent from Table 3 that foreign exchange controls, i.e., restrictions on the international 
mobility of capital, became widespread.  The macroeconomic trilemma states that a country can 
have at most two of a fixed exchange rate, independent monetary policy and unrestricted capital 
mobility (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004).  Whereas in the 1920s the modal choice by far was to sacrifice 
independent monetary policy, in the 1930s typically one or both of capital mobility and a fixed 
exchange rate were discarded.  Table 5 shows that there was a strong (though by no means perfect) 
correlation between abandonment of the fixed gold-standard exchange rate and recovery so that, 
on average, countries seem to have benefited from revising their macroeconomic trilemma choice. 
Table 6 reports a measure of increased protectionism based on tariff rates.  This is only part of the 
picture since the 1930s also saw a substantial resort to non-tariff barriers to trade such as 
quantitative restrictions perhaps affecting as much as 50 per cent of world trade (Gordon, 1941).  
Increased barriers to trade clearly played an important role in reducing trade volumes in the 1930s.  
Models based on import demand functions (Madsen, 2001) and on the historical relationship 
between world production and trade (Irwin, 2012) both suggest that protectionism accounted for 
around 40 per cent of the fall.  The goals of protectionist policies were typically to safeguard 
employment, to improve the balance of payments and to raise prices. Unlike today, there were no 
constraints from WTO membership. 
As Table 7 reports, sovereign default was widespread in the 1930s – much more so than in the debt 
crisis of the 1980s – and was an important part of the world economic crisis and the withdrawal of 
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Latin American countries in particular from the world economy.  Debts were owed to private 
bondholders rather than banks and this was important in permitting a relaxed attitude by lender 
governments (Eichengreen and Portes, 1989).   
2. Economic Disintegration in the 1930s: Analysis 
The decision to leave the gold standard was analyzed by Wolf (2008) who used a probit model to 
examine the odds of staying on gold.  His results were that a country was more likely to leave if its 
main trading partner did, if it had returned to gold at a high parity, if it was a democracy, or if the 
central bank was independent.  It was less likely to leave if it had large gold reserves, less price 
deflation, and strong banks.  In other words, decisions as to whether to leave the gold standard were 
influenced by the strength of worries about loss of monetary discipline, the extent of deflationary 
pain, and deteriorating international competitiveness.  The model predicts departures well and 
indicates that France was under the least pressure to exit in the early 1930s.  This account maps into 
various generations of currency-crisis models.  It also suggests that democratic politics undermined 
the gold standard.  As Eichengreen (1996) underlined, the extension of the franchise had made 
acceptance of deflationary policies to stay on gold much less acceptable than in the nineteenth 
century. 
For the typical small open economy in the rest of the world, the big problem as the Depression took 
hold was being subjected to deflationary pressure as world output and prices fell whilst being 
severely constrained in policymaking by membership of the gold standard.  The concept of the 
macroeconomic trilemma tells us that such a country can only have two of a fixed exchange rate, 
capital mobility and an independent monetary policy.  It follows that, for countries on the gold 
standard, a monetary-policy response to the deflationary shocks needed to be coordinated across 
countries (thereby allowing interest rate differentials to remain unchanged) but, as Wolf (2013) 
explains, international coordination was out of the question. 
Besides having no control over monetary policy, staying on the gold standard required reductions in 
prices and money wages to maintain competitiveness, and entailed high real interest rates and 
increases in real labour costs (Newell and Symons, 1988).  Leaving gold delivered autonomy over 
monetary policy with lower interest rates and real wage rates and also stimulated investment 
(Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985).  In the post gold-standard world, central banks tended to lose 
control over the conduct of monetary policy which passed to governments.  Indeed, Goodhart 
(2010) described the1930s to the 1960s as an era of ‘the subservience of central banks’.   
It is implicit in this discussion that the aggregate supply curve is positively sloped rather than vertical 
so that aggregate demand shocks have output as well as price-level effects.  This seems to be borne 
out by the evidence.  Bernanke and Carey (1996) in a careful panel-data econometric study found 
both that there was an inverse relationship between real wages and output and that this reflected 
incomplete (and indeed quite sticky) nominal wage adjustment in the presence of aggregate 
demand shocks.  The severity and duration of the downturn was increased the longer a country 
stayed on the gold standard (Bernanke, 1995).  The collapse of the gold standard clearly triggered a 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ currency war but nevertheless this delivered global reflation and was part of 
the solution not part of the problem (Eichengreen, 2013). 
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Staying on the gold standard also increased the risk of a banking crisis as balance sheets 
deteriorated, although these crises were experienced in many countries and were associated with 
weaknesses in banking systems as well as the deflationary pressures which stressed them 
(Grossman, 1994).  Banking crises were bad for the real economy and countries which went through 
them were exposed to much larger decreases in real output; the median banking crisis lasting a year 
lowered industrial output by 12 per cent according to the estimates in Bernanke and Carey (1996). 
The gold standard collapsed under the pressure of deflation.  This problem stemmed from the 
behaviour of balance-of-payments-surplus countries and the asymmetric requirement for 
adjustment placed on deficit countries.  Between 1927 and 1932 France saw its share of world gold 
reserves increase from 7 per cent to 27 per cent of the total.  Since the gold inflow was effectively 
sterilized, the policies of the Bank of France created a shortage of reserves and put other countries 
under great deflationary pressure.  By 1932, France and the United States together held 62 per cent 
of world gold reserves.  Irwin (2010) concluded that, on an accounting basis, France was probably 
more responsible even than the US for the world wide deflation of 1929-33. He calculated that 
through their ‘gold hoarding’ policies the Federal Reserve and the Banque de France together 
directly accounted for half the 30 per cent fall in prices that occurred in 1930 and 1931.  Deflation 
was accompanied by high real interest rates; central bank discount rates averaged 5 per cent as late 
as the end of 1931 and still almost 3.5 per cent in mid-1933 (Almunia et al., 2010). 
The goals of protectionist policies were typically to safeguard employment, to improve the balance 
of payments and to raise prices. Unlike today, there were no constraints from WTO membership. 
Protectionism is usually thought of as the triumph of special-interest groups but, in this period, it 
may have been more a substitute for a macroeconomic-policy response.  For example, Eichengreen 
and Irwin (2010) found that, on average, tariffs were higher in countries that stayed on gold longer 
and so had less scope to use monetary or fiscal policies to promote economic recovery.  Their paper 
suggests that the financial crisis of 1931 rather than the Smoot-Hawley tariff was the real trigger for 
the 1930s’ trade war. 
Default was typically triggered by the increased burden of debt service as the depression intensified 
and export prices fell while real interest rates rose.  Econometric analysis of the decision to default 
shows that it was more likely the higher the debt to income ratio and the greater the terms of trade 
shock but was also made more likely by unwillingness to pursue austerity policies (Eichengreen and 
Portes, 1986).  In the 1930s, maintaining debt service tended to be associated with fiscal austerity 
and measures to improve the current account of the balance of payments while the decision to 
suspend payments was often accompanied by fiscal expansion and monetary reflation.1  An analysis 
of the implications of default shows that it promoted growth, especially for heavy defaulters 
(Eichengreen and Portes, 1990). 
This analysis highlights several points of relevance to today’s Eurozone crisis.  First, back in the 1930s 
devaluation, perhaps accompanied by default, was the route to recovery.  Macroeconomic-trilemma 
choices were dramatically revised.  Second, the existence of the fixed exchange rate system was 
                                                          
1
 Maintaining fiscal sustainability is much more onerous when the debt to GDP ratio is high.  To prevent the 
debt to GDP ratio, d, increasing requires that the primary budget surplus/GDP ratio, b > d(i – π – g), where i is 
the nominal interest rate on government debt, π is the rate of inflation and g is the real GDP growth rate.  
Default reduces d, possibly to zero. 
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undermined by surplus countries which placed large burdens of adjustment on economies with weak 
balance of payments positions.  Third, exit from the gold standard was contagious.  Fourth, when 
orthodox macroeconomic policies were unavailable as a way to fight unemployment, protectionism 
was to be expected.  Finally, it should also be recognized that a long and deep contraction in GDP 
was conducive to the rise of extremist political parties, although the link was not automatic and 
depended on the structure of the electoral system and whether there was a long-standing 
democratic tradition (de Bromhead et al., 2013). 
3. Macroeconomic Policy at the ZLB 
The pre-2008 norm for the macroeconomic policy framework was inflation targeting by an 
independent central bank.  The way in which inflation targeting is implemented is generally through 
a Taylor Rule.  The central bank raises short-term interest rates if inflation is above target or if GDP is 
above the economically sustainable level – i.e., if the ‘output gap’ is negative.  Inflation targeting 
using a Taylor Rule runs into difficulties when it requires that the nominal interest rate be negative.  
This is the ‘zero lower bound’ constraint.  This is most likely to matter in times of deflation or severe 
recession especially if this is associated with a banking crisis and credit crunch (Woodford, 2011a).  
This suggests either that a strategy has to be devised to lower real interest rates by creating 
inflationary expectations and/or that it may be necessary to use expansionary fiscal policy.   
Indeed, New-Keynesian macroeconomic models have been developed which predict that fiscal 
stimulus may be expected generally to have a larger multiplier effect when interest rates are held 
constant at the lower bound, as recent discussions have emphasized.  One way in which this may 
work is when a deficit-financed increase in government spending leads expectations of inflation to 
increase.  Simulated examples of fiscal stimulus in ‘great depression’ conditions have suggested 
values in excess of 2 may be observed (Woodford, 2011b).   
In principle, the central bank can stimulate the economy by holding its interest rate down while 
encouraging people to expect inflation.  Reductions in the real interest rate sustained over a period 
of time have the potential to act as an expansionary policy so monetary policy is not impotent after 
all even when interest rates hit the zero lower bound.  This strategy may be hard to implement, 
however.  There is a problem of ‘time inconsistency’ in that the private sector may anticipate that 
the central bank will change its policy as soon as the economy starts to recover.  For the real interest 
rate policy instrument to be effective, it is vital that there is a credible commitment to future 
inflation.  One way to achieve this might be to change the policy mandate of the central bank.  
Svensson (2003) suggested that a ‘foolproof’ way to escape the liquidity trap is to combine a price-
level target path with an initial currency devaluation and a crawling exchange-rate peg which will 
require a higher price level in equilibrium and can be underpinned by creating domestic currency to 
purchase foreign exchange. Another way might be to revoke central bank independence and allow 
the finance ministry to run monetary policy 
Following exit from the gold standard, both the United Kingdom and the United States experienced 
strong recoveries in real GDP in the years 1933 to 1937 with growth rates of about 4 and about 8 per 
cent per year, respectively.  Table 8 reports estimates of real interest rates.  Both cases reflect the 
importance of changes in inflationary expectations as well as the shift to a new stance with regard to 
the macroeconomic trilemma. 
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The most persuasive account of the American turning point in 1933 is to explain it as a ‘regime 
change’ linked to the exit from the gold standard and the Thomas Amendment which granted the 
President broad discretionary powers over monetary policy (Temin and Wigmore, 1990).  Recent 
research has clarified and amplified this proposition in the context of the ZLB.  Eggertsson (2008) 
sees devaluation as a necessary but not sufficient condition since the key is not devaluation per se 
but reducing real interest rates.  In his analysis, the role of the New Deal and deficit spending is 
central but as a credible policy that raised inflationary expectations with the government targeting a 
return of prices to the 1926 level.2  The results of the calibrated DSGE model used by Eggertsson 
(2008) are that regime change accounted for around 75 per cent of the rapid rise in real GDP 
between 1933 and 1937.  It is clear from Table 8 that real interest rates fell quite dramatically and 
very quickly.  Movements in the exchange rate, which fell to $5.10 against the pound from $3.45 and 
remained in the range $4.90 to $5.10 during the next 4 years, and in gold reserves, which almost 
doubled within a year, were consistent with the ‘Foolproof Way’ to escape the liquidity trap. 
Until the UK left the gold standard, the Bank of England set interest rates with a view to maintaining 
the $4.86 parity.  In practice, this meant that policy had to ensure that rates were not out of line 
with foreign, especially American, interest rates.  After leaving gold, control of monetary policy 
passed to the Treasury and it took some time for policy to be re-set.  The opportunity to redeem the 
5% War Loan was taken in mid-1932 and £1.92 billion was converted to 3.5% War Loan 1952 saving 
interest payments of £28.8 million annually, a non-trivial amount in the context of the fiscal 
consolidation of the time.  At the same time, the so-called ‘cheap money’ policy became reasonably 
settled and clearly articulated; the Treasury Bill rate fell from 3.77% in the first quarter of 1932 to 
0.60% in the third quarter of that year, a level close to which it remained through 1938 (Howson, 
1975).  It is generally agreed that ‘cheap money’ provided a significant monetary stimulus which 
worked through raising investment, especially in house-building (Broadberry, 1986, 1987). 
Senior Treasury officials wanted the price level to rise and when the cheap money policy was 
introduced believed that prices would return at least to the 1929 level by 1935.  The Chancellor of 
the Exchequer announced the objective of raising prices at the British Empire Economic Conference 
at Ottawa in July 1932 and subsequently reiterated it frequently.  The fall in the exchange rate from 
$3.80 in March 1932 to $3.28 in December 1932 is consistent with escaping the liquidity trap in the 
‘Foolproof Way’, as is the sustained fall in the value of the pound and the large increase in foreign 
exchange reserves over the next four years which reflected intervention by the authorities to keep 
the pound down (Howson, 1980).  So market reactions suggest that the cheap money policy quickly 
became credible.  As Table 8 reports, it brought about a considerable reduction in real interest rates 
compared with the start of the decade. Obviously, this strategy does not represent an irrevocable 
commitment but it was a credible policy given that the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
were in charge rather than the Bank of England.3  Cheap money and a rise in the price level were 
clearly in the Treasury’s interests from 1932 as a route to recovery, better fiscal arithmetic, and to 
provide an alternative to the Pandora’s Box of jettisoning balanced-budget orthodoxy and adopting 
Keynesianism (Howson, 1975). 
                                                          
2
 Ever since the work of Brown (1956) it has been known that the New Deal was only a very modest fiscal 
stimulus.  With interest rates at the lower bound, the multiplier effects of an aggressive Keynesian policy might 
have been big, as the estimates of Gordon and Krenn (2010) suggest, but it was not tried. 
3
 This would not have been the case had the Bank of England run monetary policy.  Governor Norman plainly 
disliked cheap money and regarded it as a temporary expedient (Howson, 1975, p. 95). 
7 
 
The interwar British economy lived under the shadow of a large public debt to GDP ratio that was 
the legacy of World War I.  Both price deflation and recession threatened fiscal sustainability and 
this prompted a fiscal consolidation in the early 1930s which improved the structural budget 
surplus/GDP ratio by almost 4 percentage points between 1929/30 and 1933/34 (Middleton, 2010).  
After peaking in 1933 at 1.792, worries about a rising public debt to GDP ratio eased and, as Table 9 
reports by 1938, it had fallen to 1.438 even though by then rearmament was well under way.   
How could this happen?  The stark difference from the period prior to leaving the gold standard in 
September 1931 is clearly seen in Table 9.  When the price-deflationary years of the early 1930s had 
been left behind, the required primary budget surplus fell steeply and, indeed, once the differential 
between the real interest rate and the real growth rate had turned negative, it would have been 
possible to run modest primary budget deficits and still have stabilized d.  In fact, primary surpluses 
continued, albeit smaller relative to GDP, through 1938.  A check on the fiscal arithmetic shows that 
about 2/3 of the fall in d came from continuing primary budget surpluses with about 1/3 from the 
real interest rate falling below the real growth rate during the recovery.4  This experience does, 
however, underline the point that ‘financial repression’ reduced considerably the severity of the 
required fiscal squeeze to improve this fiscal indicator.5  It also makes very clear why the Treasury 
liked ‘cheap money’ and its policy to raise the price level was credible. 
This discussion has thrown up a number of points that bear on the policy options that Eurozone 
countries might like to access.  First, at the ZLB, price deflation not inflation is public enemy number 
one.  Second, conventional inflation targeting by an independent central bank is not necessarily an 
appropriate monetary policy framework in a depressed economy trying to escape the liquidity trap.  
Third, falling prices make achieving fiscal sustainability at high public debt to GDP ratios very 
demanding in terms of the required budget surplus so that, if deflation is required to restore 
competitiveness in a fixed exchange rate system, austerity fatigue is a likely consequence.  Fourth, 
by the same token, financial repression which reduces or even eliminates the need to run a primary 
budget surplus will always have political attractions when sovereigns are highly indebted and are 
unwilling or unable to default.  Finally, although the textbooks suggest that Keynesian fiscal stimulus 
policies may be effective at the ZLB, the 1930s does not provide much evidence for this because 
such policies were not really tried. 
4. The Euro Area 5 Years After the Crisis Started 
Economic performance in Eurozone countries remains very weak, as is summarized in Table 10.  
Current OECD estimates are that for the Euro Area as a whole real GDP in 2014 will still not have 
regained the pre-crisis peak while in the worst affected country, Greece, real GDP may be only about 
75 per cent of 2007.  Prolonged recession has been accompanied by rapidly rising unemployment - 
from 7.4 per cent in 2007 to a predicted 12.3 per cent in 2014 in the Euro Area but with much more 
dramatic increases in several countries including both Greece and Spain where unemployment is 
predicted to be around 28 per cent in 2014.  Price deflation has generally been avoided but inflation 
                                                          
4
 These proportions are derived using the method proposed by Ali-Abbas et al. (2011), which is an application 
of the fiscal sustainability formula in footnote 1. 
5
 ‘Financial repression’ occurs when governments intervene to gain access to funds at below market interest 
rates typically through regulations imposed on the capital market including imposing obstacles to international 
capital mobility.  This played a major part in the post-World War II reduction in D/Y in Britain (and other 
European countries) but was already a feature of the 1930s. 
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remains very low so the growth of nominal GDP in the Euro Area is projected to average only about 
1.5 per cent per year in 2013 and 2014. 
Current account positions have adjusted substantially in southern Europe where big deficits 
accompanied by capital account surpluses were prominent in 2007.  By 2012, these deficits were 
much smaller following a sudden stop in capital inflows, falls in income and improvements in 
competitiveness so that on the basis of relative unit labour costs only Italy was in a (slightly)weaker 
position than in 1999.  Even so, external debt has risen and to restore sustainable external positions 
further improvements in competitiveness are needed to stabilize net external debt to GDP ratios or, 
preferably, to reduce them to less vulnerable levels, say, 35 per cent of GDP.  For Portugal and Spain 
to achieve the latter it has been estimated that improvements in competitiveness relative to the rest 
of the Euro Area of about 30 per cent are required while for Greece the figure is nearly 80 per cent 
(Guillemette and Turner, 2013).  If these changes in relative unit labour costs were to be delivered 
through falls in domestic wages and prices, many more years of high unemployment would have to 
be endured.  Indeed, Euro-periphery economies appear close to downward nominal wage rigidity – 
only in Greece were labour costs per hour lower in 2012 than in 2008 (Eurostat, 2013). 
Table 11 reports public debt to GDP ratios.  Across the Euro Area, these are high and still rising. The 
extent of fiscal consolidation that would be required to reduce debt to GDP ratios to the Maastricht-
prescribed level of 60 per cent within a 20-year time horizon is non-trivial in many cases and debt to 
GDP ratios are likely to remain high for a long time if the only way to reduce them is fiscal orthodoxy.  
Attempts to improve competitiveness which entail price deflation would intensify the required fiscal 
consolidations.   
The long-term implications of high levels of public debt are likely to be unfavourable for growth, as is 
highlighted by growth models of the overlapping-generations variety. The adverse impacts can occur 
through a number of transmission mechanisms including reductions in market-sector capital 
formation, higher long-term interest rates and higher tax rates. Empirical research on advanced 
economies has found negative relationships; for example, Kumar and Woo (2010) estimate that a 10 
percentage point increase in D/Y is associated with a fall of about 0.2 percentage points in growth.  If 
taken literally, this could imply that the future trend growth rate would be as much as 0.75 
percentage points lower than pre-crisis.6   
A further implication of high public debt to GDP ratios is that they seriously reduce the scope for 
fiscal stimulus to boost growth.  As is well-known, worries about fiscal sustainability have already 
undermined willingness to use fiscal stimulus.  Much less widely noticed, however, is that the legacy 
of the crisis will be a lengthy period when public debt to GDP ratios are at a level which potentially 
renders fiscal stimulus ineffective.  Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) find that at debt to GDP 
ratios greater than 100 per cent fiscal multipliers are close to zero even in deep recessions while 
Ilzetzki et al. (2010) suggest that, on average, the fiscal multiplier is zero on impact and in the long 
run is actually negative at debt to GDP ratios above 60 per cent.  For Euro Area economies which 
have given up the independent monetary policy instrument the implication may be that they have 
little or no scope to deliver economic stimulus through expansionary macroeconomic policies. 
                                                          
6
 Although there is a significant negative relationship between debt and growth, the magnitude seems to vary 
across countries and the claim that a particular threshold can be identified at which the adverse effect 
intensifies is probably not robust (Egert, 2013). 
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Fears of sovereign debt crises have been exacerbated by banking crises which in turn are made 
potentially more serious by sovereign default – the so-called ‘doom-loop’.  Both types of crisis are 
made more likely by slow growth and, in turn, undermine growth performance.  According to the 
criteria adopted by IMF economists, there have been systemic banking crises in 8 Eurozone 
economies since 2008 (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and 
Spain) with borderline-systemic crises in 4 more (France, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia) (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2012).  The threat to public finances from financial instability is much larger than in 
previous generations because bank balance sheets are now much larger relative to GDP.  In 6 
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Netherlands and Spain) this ratio was at least 3 by 2009 
(Obstfeld, 2013) whereas until the 1970s it was typically less than 1 in advanced countries 
(Schularick and Taylor, 2012).  Equally, the threat to financial stability from sovereign default is 
considerably greater now than in the 1930s because the debts are owed to banks rather than private 
bondholders. 
In these circumstances, what might the 1930s suggest is likely to happen?  Prima facie, the 
possibilities seem fairly clear.  The macroeconomic-trilemma framework points to exits from the 
Euro since devaluation has attractions for the periphery countries of Southern Europe because it 
would allow more policy sovereignty and a route to an early return to growth.  The experience of 
monetary policy at the ZLB suggests that the Eurozone may be more likely to survive if the European 
Central Bank credibly targets higher rates of inflation for a period; this would not only reduce real 
interest rates but would also reduce real wages and restore competitiveness in the periphery 
(Schmitt-Groheˊand Uribe, 2012).  If neither of these comes about, then financial repression and/or 
sovereign default together with protectionism may take the place of orthodox macroeconomic and 
debt-management policies.  Unless, of course, history is a poor guide and this time really is different. 
5. The Future of the Eurozone through a Political-Trilemma Lens 
These arguments can be developed more fully in the framework of the political trilemma 
(reproduced in Figure 1), originally proposed by Rodrik (2000) and recently used by Crum (2013) to 
consider the future of the Eurozone.  The trilemma is that it is possible to have at most 2 of deep 
economic integration, democratic politics and the nation state.  If a ‘golden straitjacket’ choice is 
made, then democratic politics is subservient to a rules-based system of governance while if global 
federalism is chosen, the nation state loses at least some of its political authority but democracy 
obtains at the federal level.   
The 1930s’ implosion of the Gold Standard can be understood in terms of this political trilemma, as 
follows. In the 1920s, with the return to the Gold Standard, countries had signed up to the ‘golden 
straitjacket’, which had been acceptable in the context of very limited democracy in the 19th century 
but in the 1930s democratic politics at the level of the nation state over-ruled this policy choice 
(Eichengreen, 1996).  To retain the benefits of deep economic integration would have required 
action to organize it through democratic politics at a supranational level but this was not feasible.  
When reconstruction of the international economy was subsequently undertaken under the 
auspices of the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement, economic integration was severely restricted by 
controls on international capital flows (the ‘Bretton-Woods compromise’ in Figure 1).  The idea of 
the ’Bretton-Woods Compromise’ was to sacrifice some aspects of economic integration to provide 
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sufficient policy space to make saving the remaining aspects (in this case moving back to freer trade) 
politically acceptable rather than accept the full 1930s’ retreat from globalization. 
Despite the apparent precedent of the 1930s, the Eurozone has not yet collapsed so this time may 
be different for several reasons which imply that the benefit/cost ratio of leaving the gold standard 
was rather different from that of exit from the Euro.  First, this may be a Pyrrhic victory because it 
could well engender capital flight and a devastating bank run – or, put differently, ‘the mother of all 
financial crises’ (Eichengreen and Temin, 2013).  Second, the perception of dire consequences of a 
devaluation and default for other Eurozone countries in an integrated capital market with much 
bigger bank balance sheets that feature substantial amounts of sovereign debt led to the provision 
of financial support with conditionality under the auspices of the ‘troika’.  Third, the European 
Central Bank has acted as a lender of last resort not only to banks but also to sovereigns through 
sovereign debt purchases and its offer of outright monetary transactions (OMT). 
Furthermore, the initial thrust of policy proposals by the European Commission (2012) is to 
strengthen the ‘Golden Straitjacket’ to preserve deep economic integration and the primacy of the 
nation state but at the expense of democracy.  The Commission charts a path through new fiscal 
rules together with the beginnings of a banking union in terms of a single supervisory mechanism 
(SSM) followed by a single resolution mechanism (SRM).  Crum (2013, p. 615) sees this as ‘a strategy 
with considerable justification’ since democratic federalization is out of reach and thus the only 
realistic alternative is collapse of EMU. 
Yet, European Commission (2012) clearly envisages that reforms should ideally go much further and 
require treaty changes.  Later stages of the process that it spells out include a full fiscal union and 
participatory democracy at the federal level including direct election of an EU President.  Arguably, 
given the size of bank balance sheets relative to national economies, an effective banking union, 
which would ensure financial stability and break the doom-loop, entails more than the SSM and 
SRM; it requires a supranational fiscal backstop that underpins deposit insurance and allows the 
issue of Eurobonds (Obstfeld, 2013).  So, the ‘golden straitjacket’ may not be enough to save EMU. 
A ‘United States of Europe’ would entail banking union, fiscal union, and a constitution that ended 
Europe’s ‘democratic deficit’.  Wolf (2012) spells out what this might enable. He notes that it would 
allow more effective European fiscal and monetary policy at the ZLB, and political legitimization of a 
much higher level of transfer payments from an expanded European budget while also finding a way 
to share burdens of adjustment between surplus and deficit countries.  The advantages of this 
political-trilemma choice are the realization of economies of scale in the provision of federal public 
goods, the internalization of externalities and mutual insurance against asymmetric shocks 
(Spolaore, 2013).  However, voters in different European countries have very different preferences 
for design of a reformed EU, i.e., ‘heterogeneity costs’ are probably too high to allow the realization 
of these putative benefits. 
The economic history of the 1930s offers no guide as to the feasibility of ‘global federalism’ as a 
solution to the political trilemma but it does speak to the trajectory that might develop as a modern 
equivalent to the ‘Bretton-Woods Compromise’ - rather than the collapse of the Euro which Crum 
(2013) takes to be the third trilemma outcome.  It is unlikely that we will see the re-imposition of 
capital controls across Europe on the scale of the 1950s but it may be that some economic 
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disintegration could make life within the Euro more politically tolerable for countries that otherwise 
have very limited policy space – indeed, this is already happening. 
In the 1930s, countries ‘trapped’ in the gold standard turned to imposing barriers to trade, faute de 
mieux.  Today’s equivalent includes increased reluctance to implement the Single Market in services 
and the creeping protectionism documented by Global Trade Alert (Table 12).  These interventions 
are mostly not flagrant violations of WTO rules and traditional tariff measures are only a small part 
of what has happened.  The European Commission and EU member states have been by far the most 
active protectionists accounting for 335 measures.  EU protectionism has entailed a relatively high 
level of discrimination against foreign commercial interests and of selectivity among firms compared 
with other leading economic powers and 84 per cent of interventions in the EU have employed 
policy instruments that are subject to low or no regulation by the WTO using measures such as 
bailouts, trade finance, and subsidies, with the EU state-aids regime effectively suspended (Aggarwal 
and Evenett, 2012). 
If high primary surpluses are required to achieve fiscal consolidation for countries which face high 
debt to GDP ratios and low rates of growth of nominal GDP, ‘austerity fatigue’ is a real worry.  
Indeed, Buiter and Rabhari (2013) have argued that in some cases the maximum politically feasible 
budget surplus may be less than that required for fiscal sustainability.  This implies the attraction of 
‘financial repression’ in the sense of manipulating the interest rate paid on government debt in 
order to use a positive differential between the real growth rate and the real interest rate to bear 
some of the burden of debt to GDP reduction, as in 1930s’ Britain.  The increment to growth from 
greater financial integration in European countries which was realized pre-crisis (Gehringer, 2013) is 
at risk if moves towards financial repression intensify and entail barriers to capital flows together 
with reductions in cross-border lending.7  
Economic disintegration on this scale would have some adverse supply-side effects on growth but 
this might still be preferable to the impact of a collapse of the Euro.  How costly that might be is a 
matter of speculation but estimates suggest it would be very disruptive; for example, Cliffe (2011) 
suggests that after 5 years real GDP in the Euro Area would still be 5 per cent lower than at the 
break-up.  It is also reasonable to suggest that there would be a permanent adverse effect on GDP 
levels, although perhaps not as large as has sometimes been claimed.  The currency-union effect on 
trade volumes was once thought to be very large but better econometrics and the opportunity to 
examine the actual impact of EMU now suggests that trade volumes increased by perhaps 2 per cent 
(Baldwin et al., 2008) with the implication that the trade effect on GDP was less than 1 per cent.  
There are, however, several channels through which EMU may have raised productivity and a recent 
study found that EMU had raised the level of real GDP per hour worked by 2 per cent (Barrell et al., 
2008); this would potentially be at risk. 
6. Conclusions 
The economic history of the 1930s offers some clues about the future of the Eurozone but obviously 
does not provide a full template.  Today’s world is different in important ways from that of 80 years 
                                                          
7
 There have already been some such moves in the form of financial regulation (Reinhart, 2012) while cross-
border investment in Europe has fallen by over 50% since 2008 and cross-border debt holdings by Eurozone 
banks have returned to 1999 levels. 
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ago when the gold standard collapsed.  In particular, institutions have changed in the context of 
European integration and the treaty obligations of WTO membership while capital is more 
internationally mobile and information travels faster. 
Taken at face value, the example of the 1930s suggests that there are big attractions for struggling 
Eurozone economies to return to growth via a strategy of devaluation and default, and to exit from 
the currency union.  The advantages would potentially include improved competitiveness and 
circumventing downward nominal wage rigidity, less need to run primary budget surpluses in pursuit 
of fiscal sustainability and the opportunity to implement a new monetary-policy framework.  
However, whether exit can be achieved without triggering a massive financial crisis is doubtful. 
An option that was not available in the 1930s may be for the European Union to undergo a major 
institutional reform to deliver a fully-federal Europe with a banking union, a fiscal union and 
democratic legitimacy.  In principle, this certainly could sustain a combination of deep economic 
integration and democratic politics with the implication that the currency union is saved by 
downsizing the role of the nation state.  Unfortunately, this requires a level of political agreement 
across EU member states that is unlikely to be realized. 
The approach of the European Commission to making the Euro more robust has been to propose 
steps towards a banking union and new fiscal rules while respecting the primacy of the nation state.  
However, this does not deal with the lack of policy space that bedevils southern Europe and may not 
be enough if austerity, stagnation and high unemployment continue.  Here the 1930s’ (and 1940s’) 
precedent of the ‘Bretton-Woods compromise’ has some relevance.  By accepting some economic 
disintegration in terms of financial repression and protectionist policies, the survival chances of the 
Eurozone may be enhanced.  Nevertheless, this would have some costs in terms of lower growth in 
the medium term even if less traumatic than a disorderly collapse of EMU. 
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Table 1.  The Great Depression in the Advanced Countries 
 Real GDP Price Level Unemployment (%) Trade Volume 
1929 100.0 100.0 7.2 100.0 
1930 95.2 90.8 14.1 94.8 
1931 89.2 79.9 22.8 89.5 
1932  83.3 73.1 31.4 76.5 
1933 84.3 71.7 29.8 78.4 
1934 89.0 75.3 23.9 79.6 
1935 94.0 77.6 21.9 81.8 
1936 100.6 81.4 18.0 85.7 
1937 105.3 91.5 14.3 97.4 
1938 105.4 90.4 16.5 87.0 
 
Sources: 
Real GDP: Maddison (2010), western European countries plus western offshoots. 
Price Level: League of Nations (1941); data are for wholesale prices, weighted average of 17 
countries. 
Unemployment: Eichengreen and Hatton (1988); data are for industrial unemployment, unweighted 
average of 11 countries. 
Trade volume: Maddison (1985), weighted average of 16 countries. 
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Table 2.  Banking Crises, 1929-38 
Argentina 1931, 1934 
Austria 1931-2 
Belgium 1931, 1934 
Brazil 1931, 1937 
Denmark 1931 
Estonia 1930-2 
Finland 1931 
France 1930-2 
Czechoslovakia 1931 
Germany 1931 
Greece 1931 
Hungary 1931 
Italy 1930-1, 1935 
Latvia 1931 
Norway 1931 
Poland 1931 
Portugal 1931-2 
Romania 1931 
Spain 1931 
Sweden 1931-2 
Switzerland 1931 
Turkey 1931 
United States 1930-3 
Yugoslavia 1931 
 
Sources: Bernanke and James (1991); Bordo et al. (2001); Grossman (2010); Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009) 
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Table 3.  Dates of Changes in Gold Standard Policies 
 Return to Gold Suspension of 
Gold Standard 
Foreign Exchange 
Control 
Devaluation 
Argentina 08/1927 12/1929 10/1931 11/1929 
Australia 04/1925 12/1929  03/1930 
Austria 04/1925 04/1933 10/1931 09/1931 
Belgium 10/1926 03/1935 03/1935 03/1935 
Bolivia 07/1928 09/1931 10/1931 03/1930 
Brazil 01/1927 12/1929 05/1931 12/1929 
Bulgaria 01/1927  10/1931  
Canada 07/1926 10/1931  09/1931 
Chile 01/1926 04/1932 07/1931 04/1932 
Columbia 07/1923 09/1931 09/1931 01/1932 
Costa Rica 10/1922  01/1932 01/1932 
Cuba 06/1919 11/1933 06/1934 04/1933 
Czechoslovakia 04/1926  10/1931 02/1934 
Denmark 01/1927 09/1931 11/1931 09/1931 
Ecuador 08/1927 02/1932 05/1932 06/1932 
El Salvador 01/1920 10/1931 08/1933 10/1931 
Estonia 01/1928 06/1933 11/1931 06/1933 
Finland 01/1926 10/1931  10/1931 
France 08/1926   10/1936 
Germany 09/1924  07/1931  
Greece 05/1928 04/1932 09/1931 04/1932 
Guatemala    04/1933 
Hungary 04/1925  07/1931  
Italy 12/1927  05/1934 10/1936 
Japan 12/1930 12/1931 07/1932 12/1931 
Latvia 08/1922  10/1931  
Netherlands 04/1925 09/1936  09/1936 
Nicaragua 06/1919 11/1931 11/1931 01/1932 
Norway 05/1928 09/1931   
New Zealand 04/1925 09/1931  04/1930 
Panama 06/1919   04/1933 
Paraguay 08/1927  08/1932 11/1929 
Peru 05/1928 05/1932  05/1932 
Poland 10/1927  04/1936 10/1936 
Romania 02/1929  05/1932 07/1935 
Spain   05/1931  
Sweden 04/1924 09/1931  09/1931 
Switzerland 06/1925   09/1936 
United Kingdom 05/1925 09/1931  09/1931 
United States 06/1919 03/1933 03/1933 04/1933 
Uruguay 01/1928 12/1929 09/1931 04/1929 
Yugoslavia 06/1931  10/1931 07/1932 
 
Sources: Bernanke and James (1991); Brown (1940); Wolf and Yousef (2007) 
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Table 4.  Price Levels as a Percentage of 1929 Purchasing Power Parities in December 1933 
(129 = 100) 
 Cost of French Franc Cost of Pound Sterling 
Austria   98.4   76.8 
Belgium 115.2   90.0 
Denmark 138.2 108.0 
Finland 123.9   96.7 
France    78.1 
Germany   92.5   72.3 
Greece 137.0 107.0 
Italy 112.6   88.0 
Netherlands 119.6   93.5 
Norway 129.1 100.8 
Spain 158.4 123.7 
Sweden 130.9 102.3 
Switzerland 100.4   78.5 
United Kingdom 128.0  
United States 136.3 106.6 
 
Note: 
The relationship between the general level of wholesale prices in each country and (a) France and 
(b) United Kingdom in 1929 is taken as 100.  The relationship in each subsequent period (on the 
basis 1929 = 100) is taken as the purchasing-power-parity exchange rate, and the actual exchange 
rate prevailing in that period is then expressed as a percentage of the purchasing-power-parity rate. 
Source: Eichengreen (1992, Table 12.3). 
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Table 5.  Dates of Changes in Gold Standard Policies and Economic Recovery 
 Return to 1929 
Income Level 
Devaluation 
Austria 1939 09/1931 
Belgium 1939 03/1935 
Denmark * 09/1931 
Finland 1934 10/1931 
France 1939 10/1936 
Germany 1935 * 
Greece 1933 04/1932 
Italy 1938 10/1936 
Netherlands 1949 09/1936 
Norway 1932 09/1931 
Spain 1955 * 
Sweden 1934 09/1931 
Switzerland 1946 09/1936 
United Kingdom 1934 09/1931 
United States 1940 04/1933 
 
Notes: real GDP per person never fell below the 1929 level in Denmark, Germany did not devalue 
but by imposing exchange controls effectively left the gold standard in July 1931, Spain was not on 
the gold standard. 
Sources: Bernanke and James (1991); The Maddison Project (2013) 
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Table 6.  Tariff Rates, 1928, 1935 and 1938 (%) 
 1928 1935 1938 
Austria   8.1 17.5 14.8 
Belgium   3.4   8.3   6.7 
Canada 15.9 15.4 13.9 
Czechoslovakia   7.8 10.0   7.2 
Denmark   5.5   8.2   7.3 
France   6.6 16.9 16.6 
Germany   7.9 30.1 33.4 
Hungary 11.0   7.2 12.0 
Italy   6.7 22.2 12.1 
Japan   7.1   6.2   6.6 
Netherlands   2.1   9.1   6.7 
New Zealand 17.1 17.5 16.4 
Norway 11.5 14.4 12.2 
Spain 24.1 27.9 n/a 
Sweden   9.3 10.1   9.5 
Switzerland   9.3 23.3 18.1 
United Kingdom 10.0 24.5 24.1 
United States 13.8 17.5 15.5 
 
Note: tariff rate is defined as customs revenue/value of imports. 
Source: Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) 
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Table 7.  Sovereign Debt Defaults, 1929-1938 
Austria 1932 
Bolivia 1931 
Brazil 1931 
Bulgaria 1932 
Chile 1931 
Colombia 1932 
Costa Rica 1937 
Cuba 1933 
Dominican Republic 1931 
Ecuador 1931 
El Salvador 1931 
Germany 1932 
Guatemala 1933 
Hungary 1931 
Nicaragua 1932 
Panama 1932 
Paraguay 1932 
Peru 1931 
Poland 1936 
Romania 1933 
Uruguay 1933 
Yugoslavia 1933 
 
Source: Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007) 
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Table 8.  Real Interest Rates (%) 
 USA USA UK UK 
 Real Short 
Rate 
Real Long 
Rate 
Real Short 
Rate 
Real Long 
Rate 
1929   5.78   5.25  5.26 5.14 
1930   6.00   5.87  8.63 8.01 
1931 11.73   9.38  9.73 9.20 
1932 14.24 13.68  5.11 7.24 
1933   7.16 12.17  0.66 5.65 
1934  -3.07   5.97  0.80 4.26 
1935  -1.55   2.26  0.59 3.59 
1936  -0.75   0.97 -2.86 1.22 
1937  -2.00   0.70 -2.09 0.93 
1938   2.32   2.55 -2.56 0.99 
 
Note: 
Real rates of interest are calculated on an ex-post basis.  Real long rates are based on the yield of 
consols minus a 3 year backward-looking weighted average of actual inflation rates;  for further 
details, see Chadha and Dimsdale (1999).  I am grateful to Jagjit Chadha for providing me with the 
data. 
Source: 
Chadha and Dimsdale (1999). 
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Table 9.  Fiscal Sustainability Data for United Kingdom, 1925-1938 
 b i π g d b* 
1925-9 average 6.78 4.72 -0.99 2.22 1.636 5.71 
1930 6.15 4.75 -0.40 -3.72 1.592 14.12 
1931 5.41 4.51 -2.40 -2.37 1.698 15.76 
1932 7.25 4.49 -3.58 0.65 1.736 12.88 
1933 7.42 3.90 -1.40 4.74 1.792 1.00 
1934 6.76 3.58 -0.68 4.78 1.731 -0.90 
1935 5.68 3.64 0.87 4.26 1.650 -2.46 
1936 4.95 3.59 0.55 4.15 1.587 -1.76 
1937 3.89 3.67 3.73 3.17 1.472 -4.75 
1938 1.56 3.62 2.77 0.42 1.438 0.62 
1933-8 average 5.04 3.67 1.67 3.59 1.612 -1.38 
 
Note: 
The required primary budget surplus to GDP ratio, b*, satisfies the condition that Δd = 0, where 
 Δd = -b + (i – π – g)d 
Sources: 
b, primary budget surplus to GDP ratio, i, average nominal interest rate on government debt, d, 
public debt to GDP ratio from Middleton (2010) database; π, rate of inflation based on GDP deflator 
from Feinstein (1972); g, 4th quarter real GDP growth rate, from Mitchell et al. (2012).  
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Table 10.  Macroeconomic Indicators 
 2007 2012 2014 
Real GDP (2007 = 100)    
France    100   99.9 100.4 
Germany    100 103.5 105.9 
Greece    100   80.0   75.2 
Ireland    100   93.9   96.6 
Italy    100   93.1   91.8 
Portugal    100   94.2   91.9 
Spain    100   95.9   94.6 
Euro Area    100   98.8   99.3 
Inflation (%/year)    
France     2.6   1.3   0.8 
Germany     1.6   1.3   1.7 
Greece     3.3 -0.8 -2.1 
Ireland     0.7   1.9   1.2 
Italy     2.4   1.6   0.9 
Portugal     2.8 -0.1   0.0 
Spain     3.3   0.3   0.4 
Euro Area     2.3   1.2   1.1 
Current Account (%GDP)    
France   -1.0 -2.3 -1.9 
Germany     7.5   7.1   6.0 
Greece -14.6 -3.4   0.9 
Ireland   -5.4   4.9   5.2 
Italy   -2.4 -0.6   2.0 
Portugal -10.1 -1.5   0.5 
Spain -10.0 -1.1   3.5 
Euro Area     0.2   1.9   2.8 
Unemployment (%)    
France    8.0 9.9 11.1 
Germany    8.3 5.3   4.8 
Greece    8.3 24.2 28.4 
Ireland    4.6 14.7 14.1 
Italy    6.1 10.6 12.5 
Portugal    8.0 15.6 18.6 
Spain    8.3 25.0 28.0 
Euro Area    7.4 11.2 12.3 
 
Notes: 
Inflation based on GDP deflator 
Sources: 
OECD (2013). 
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Table 11.  Debt Ratios in 2012 and Fiscal Consolidation ‘Required’. 
 Public 
Debt/GDP (%) 
Fiscal 
Consolidation 
2012-2014 (%) 
Average Fiscal 
Consolidation from 
2014 to 2030 (%) 
Peak Fiscal 
Consolidation (%) 
France 109.7 2.4 2.4 4.3 
Germany   89.2 -0.1 0.0 1.5 
Greece 165.6 3.2 3.2 8.1 
Ireland 123.3 3.1 2.5 5.0 
Italy 140.2 1.5 0.4 3.6 
Portugal 138.8 2.1 3.7 7.7 
Spain   90.5 2.8 2.5 4.9 
Euro Area 103.9 1.4 1.1 2.4 
 
Notes: 
Fiscal consolidation is improvement in primary balance/GDP; the ‘requirement’ is to reduce debt to 
GDP to 60% by 2030. 
The notion of the peak requirement is an adjustment to put debt on a downward trajectory towards 
the target which is followed by gradual relaxation as declining debt leads to lower debt service 
payments and convergence towards the target allows a slowdown in the pace of debt reduction. 
Source:  OECD (2013) 
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Table 12.  Crisis Era Protectionist Measures Recorded by Global Trade Alert 
Bailout/State Aid 324 Migration 47 
Trade Defence 289 Investment 46 
Tariff 166 Public Procurement 41 
Non-Tariff Barrier (n.e.s) 110 Export Subsidy/Incentives 38 
Export Taxes   85 Import Ban 28 
 
Note: ‘trade defence’ comprises antidumping, countervailing duties and safeguard measures 
Source: Baldwin and Evenett (2012)  
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